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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE G. McANERNEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY, DRIVERS'
LICENSE DIVISION, and
GEORGE C. MILLER, Director,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No. 8969

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ST~TEMENT

OF FACTS

The following facts are undisputed. Mr. McAnerney is a resident of Utah. He is the sole sales representative in the intermountain area for a large
paper company (R. p. 11). By the nature of his
business he is required to drive long distances, averaging 800 to 1000 miles a week (R. p. 11-12). He
has been driving an automobile since 1932, a period
of 27 years, and has never been involved in an accident (R. p.12-13).
On March 8, 1956, he was arrested by the Utah.
1
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Highway Patrol for speeding in Brigham City. On
March 28, 1957 he was arrested by the Utah Highway Patrol for speeding near Farmington, Utah,
being clocked at 66 miles per hour in a 50-mile
zone. On May 28, 1957, he was arrested for speeding in Salt Lake City. On the basis of these three
arrests the Department of Motor Vehicles did issue
a notice of suspension of his driver's 'license for a
three-month period. On October 11, 1957, after Mr.
McAnerney had come to see defendant George Miller, this was changed to a restricted license (Ex.
P-1, p. 2). Mr. McAnerney has been charged with
no other traffic offenses in the State of Utah until
May 19, 1958, when he was again arrested for
speeding on South State Street in Salt Lake County.
The files of the Motor Vehicle Department have
reports from the Arizona Highway Patrol indicating a charged traffic violation in Tucson on March
16, 1958, (which McAnerney testified was for making a "rolling stop" on a Sunday morning. R. p. 1516) and from the State of Nevada indicating a
charged violation in Nevada January 23, 1958,
(which McAnerney testified was for going about
35 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone. R. p. 16-17).
On July 1, 1958, Mr. McAnerney received another notice of suspension suspending his license for
six months, for the stated reason of habitual negligent driving. On July 22, 1958, Mr. McAnerney and
2
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his counsel did request a hearing and appeared on
that date before defendant Miller who read over his
file with the dates and offenses charged against McAnerney and did inform them that this constituted
a hearing, that he would not go behind on the documents in his file, and that McAnerney was habitually negligent ( R. p. 1-2.). McAnerney appealed
from this determination and after hearing the District Cou--t~ the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson presiding, did on August 8, 1958, rule that the order
of suspension of McAnerney's license was null and
void and would be set aside (R. p. 30-32.).
Shortly thereafter, on September 4, 1958, defendants did issue an additional order of suspension. McAnerney requested in writing a hearing
and on September 22nd McAnerney and h'is counsel appeared before Mr. Miller and a stenographer
of his office.
The stenographer's notes, introduced in evidence as Exhibit P-1, showed that the fol1lowing was
said:
This is a hearing before George C. Miller, Director of Drivers' License Division, as
hearing officer. 'This is the date set as requested by George Gardner McAnerney at the
request of his attorney Albert J. Colton as
the result of a six months' suspension of Mr.
McAnerney's driving privilege in the State
of Utah.
The record can show that his license had
3
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been suspended by the Drivers' License Division on October 7, 1957 for a period of three
months at which tim~ Mr. McAnerney requested a hearing and was granted a restricted driver's license to drive in connection with
his work with International Paper Company.
The record will further show that there is here
in connection with this hearing the driver
license folder of Mr. McAnerney including
the Reports of Conviction from the respective
courts wherein Mr. McAnerney has been
charged with certain violations of the traffic
laws. The record may show that in the opinion of the Department it is not necessary to
subpoena any of the officers who have given
citations or the judges to prove the convictions in this driver folder nor to subpoena
any witnesses, nor any records in addition
to the record as held by the department.
Mr. Colton: Just a minute Mr. Miller,
do you intend to put on any evidence?
Mr. Miller: None whatever other than
the record itself.
Mr. Colton: Are you offering the record as e,~idence?
Mr. Miller: I am accepting it as evidence.
Mr. Col ton : 1~ ou are acting in this case
in the capacity of the hearing officer?
Mr. Miller: Correct.
Mr. Colton: And you are submitting to
us the file?
Mr. Miller: That is correct and accepting it.
4
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Mr. Colton: And as I understand it the
State of Utah does not intend to put on any
evidence other than the file?
Mr. MHler:

None whatever.

Mr. Colton: I would like ---------------------record a motion that the suspension of Mr.
McAnerney's driver's license be vacated on
the grounds for the reason that the State of
Utah has failed to put on sufficient evidence
to constitute good cause to show that Mr.
l\1cAnerney is an habitually negligent driver,
and that pursuant to the provisions of the
applicable statutes and further pursuant to
the request for a hearing made by me in writing in a letter addressed to Mr. Miller on Septen1be:r 8, 1958, it was requested that the Department produce vvitnesses to testify under
oath as to the reason for the Order of Suspension on the grounds stated so that Mr. McAnerney through his counsel could cross examine these witnesses and examine the relevant books and papers which would be produced pursuant to this request.
lVIr. Mil'ler: The Department has deemed under Section 41-2-19 Utah Code Annotated 1953 subsection 4 that Mr. McAnerney
is an habitually negligent driver and denies
the motion as heretofore stated by Mr. Colton.
Mr. Colton: Again for the record Mr.
Miller as a background for another motion I
would like to make I am not sure what relevance to this hearing the fact that Mr. McAnerney's license was suspended on October
7, 1957, has and without any showing of re5
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striction I would motion to strike from the
record any records of this.
Mr. Miller: The procedure of the Drivers' License Division as established is that
when an individual has three moving violations in any consecutive 18 month period the
first suspension is a three-month suspension.
The second suspension is a six-month suspension. 'The situation in this proceeding at the
present time is that Mr. McAnerney has had
his six months' suspension in accordance with
the administrative procedure of the Department.
Mr. Colton: But doesn't it have anything to do with whether Mr. McAnerney is
or is not an habitual negligent driver?
Mr. Miller : As in the fact that he has
had a previous suspended license and has been
before the Department and apprised of his
violations and then the continued violations
as shown by the record is evidence that he
is an habitual negligent driver as provided
in the section heretofore stated.
Mr. Colton: I would like to move to
strike any reference to the previous suspension on the grounds that the record as it now
stands shows no reference to the previous
suspension on the grounds of ------------------------·
Mr. Miller: That will 'be denied.
Mr.

Co~ton:

I take it the State rests.

Mr. Miller: Yes, call Mr. McAnerney
to be sworn in . . .
Mr. Colton :

I take it that the basis
6
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upon which the State is acting are the violations which are shown on the file where it
says "Applicant's Driving Record this side
for Department use only?"
Mr. Miller: And also the reports of
conviction in the folder itself.
Mr. Cotton: I notice that there is a
line drawn betewen the first and second notations.

'Mr"'. Miller: That was a line made by
myself when Mr. McAnerney was in my Office as of October 11, 1957, at which time I
granted him a restricted license in connection with his record up to October '7, 1957.
At that time McAnerney did testify describing in detail the facts and circumstances surrounding each event referred to in 'the Department's files.
M'i'ller then entered an order suspending McAnerney's license from which McAnerney appealed to
the District Court. McAnerney petitioned for review, alleging that defendants had unconstitutionally deprived him of property without due process
and improperly found him 'to be an habitual negligent driver. (R. p. 36-39)
The matter was heard again by the Honorable
Aldon J. Anderson. The court stated a:t the outset
of the hearing "As it stands, as the court views the
statute, is the fact that the Department found he
was a negligent driver, and you may put on evi7
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dence to refute that." (R. p. 10). Mr. McAnerney
was put on the stand and testified to the facts
surrounding the citations contained in the State's
file.
!The State put on no testimony other than that
of Mr. Miller who merely stated that he had given
Mr. McAnerney a hearing. Although the transcript
does not show it, evidently the following documents
were marked and accepted into evidence:
Three reports of conviction for violation of motor vehicle laws, Form DLD-19
3-56.
Exhibit 3 had attached to it a form "Citation" of Utah Highway Patrol. Exhibit 1
had upon it the words "Bail posted and forfeited".
The trial court then entered findings of fact
reciting that '''Based upon the record of six arrests
for moving vehicle violations contained in files of
defendants herein, within a period of 18 months,
three within the Sta:te of Utah, and three without
the State of Utah, and based on the testimony of
plaintiff 'before this court, plaintiff is declared to
be an habituaJlly negligent driver," and the administrative action was affirmed. From this determination, Mr. McAnerney appeals.
8
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
INTRODUCTION
POINT II.
APPELLANT IS NOT AN HABI'TUAL NEGLIGENT
DRIVER.

a.
b.
c.

Definitions.
The means by which the State attempted to
'JYrov,e its case were improper and unconstitutional.
Even if the means used by the State to prove
its case ~vere proper, the evidence is not
sufficient to prove habitual negligence.

POINT III.
THE STATE ERRED IN USING 'THE SAME EVIDENCE TWICE.
POINT IV.
COURTS HAVE NOT HESITATED TO RIGIDLY
CONSTRUE STATUTES OF THIS SORT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
INTRODUCTION

Appellant, as one who drives on the publ'ic highways much more than the average person, would be
the first to recognize that the safety of all people,
including himself, must be safeguarded by the
State of Utah's sincere and earnest attempts to enforce its traffic laws. But as history shows, it is
often the overzealousness of those working for ad9
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mittedly worthy ends that pose some of the greatest
threats to our democratic society. It is appellant's
contention tha:t the cries of the public and of the
press for traffic "enforcement" must not overshadow the basic rights and dignity of each citizen,
and of the orderly process of law in a field which
proba!bly brings more people in contact with the
machinery of law enforcement than any other. Appellant contends that the State has not shown him
to be habitually negligent.
POINT II.
APPELLANT IS NOT AN HABI'TUAL NEGLIGENT
DRIVER.

a. Definitions.
"Habitual" has been defined as something
which is ''repeated by force of habit." Webster's
New International Dictionary 2nd Sd. "Habit" is
defined as "A settled disposition or tendency . . .
leading one to do easily, naturally, and with growing skill or certainty what one does often." 'The
State would have one believe that the record here
pellant ·contends that the State has used an improper
pocedure and has not shown him to be ha:bitual1y
negligent.
The means by which the State attempted to
prove its cas.e were improper and unconstitutional.
The statute under which the respondents prob.

10
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ceeded is Section 41-2-19, Utah Code Annotated
1953. This provides inter alia that three moving
violations of the motor vehicle laws of Utah shal1
be deemed prima facie evidence of habitual negligence and that the Department may immediately
suspend the license without receiving a record of
conviction whenever the Department has reason to
believe that such person is an habitual negligent
driver.
However, the law further provides that upon
suspending such a license the person shall be entitled to a hearing and further
''Upon such hearing the Department or
its duly authorized agent rnay administer
oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers and may require reexamination of the licensee. One or more members of the Department may conduct such
hearing, and any decision made after a hearing before any number of the members of the
Department shall be as valid as if made after
a hearing before the full membership of the
Department. After such hearing the Department shall either rescind its order of suspension or, good caus.e appearing therefor, may
extend the suspension of such license or re
voke such license." (Emphasis ours.)
Appellant contends that this statute places the
burden of proof upon the State to show good cause
if they choose to suspend the license, and that the
administrative travesty set forth as a "hearing"
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in this case could not conceivably be construed as
meeting this test. Moreover, Appellant contends that
the trial judge also misconstrued the function of
the statute by stating that it was up to the driver
to refute this finding, and to base the court's conclusion to any extent on the evidence of convictions
contained in the State's files was erroneous.
Mr. Miller acted as judge and prosecutor. He
merely looked at his file, found what he considered
evidence of three violations, and made his determination. He expressly rejected appellant's rights
to cross-examine those who executed the documents
in question or to confront them and made his determination even prior to Mr. McAnerney's chance to
tell his own story.
It has been clearly established by many courts
that such procedure is improper.
"Where a hearing is required, it must
be held in accordance with the statute or ordinance, and, where the officer before whom
the hearing 'is had exercises quasi-judicial
functions, he must exercise them in a legal
manner. Such hearing is a judicial hearing
a:t which the acting board or official may act
only on . the specific charges made and 'the
licensee has a right to be confronted by the
witnesses who testify against him, and should
be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine
his accusers. The decision revoking the license must be based on legal evidence of sufficient weight to support such charges; but
12
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if such hearing is civil in its nature, even
though the charges made are based on the
commission of a crime, the charges so made
may be established by a preponderance of
the evidence." 60 C.J.S. 492, Motor Vehicles
Sec. 160.
Thus a New York court in a hearing dealing
with the revocation of a driver's license, where evidence supporting the State was introduced in the
form of affidavits from police officers, made the
foUowing statement:
"In determining that question it must
be remembered that the license which has
been annulled is of substantial value 'to the
petitioner. It is a permit issued according to
law by the Motor Vehicle Bureau for him to
drive an automdbile, without which it would
be unlawful for him to do so. He has a vested
right therein which cannot be taken from him
capriciously or arbitrarily.
"In a proceeding of this kind the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is given quasijudicial functions which he must exercise 'in
a legal manner. 'The revocation of petitioner's
license was not based upon a conviction ; therefore it can only be revoked after a hearing
and upon good cause based upon comp~tent
'legal testimony. Petitioner has a right to be
confronted with the witness at such hearing
and given an opportunity to cross-examine
his accusers. That is the only way he can secure a fair hearing (citing cases). Failure
to give the accused an opportunity to be heard
in his own defense and to cross-examine his
13
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accusers violates a basic right secured to every
citizen by our Constitution.
"In my opinion, substantial rights of the
petitioner were violated to his prejudice when
the Commissioner received the affidavit of the
witness Barry and the testimony of the witness Garman without giving the petitioner
an opportunity to be confronted by his accusers and to cross-examine them or either
of them.
"Petitioner's application to vacate the
order of revocation of petitioner's license is
granted." Re application of Goodwin, 173
Misc. 169, 17 N.Y. Supp. 2d 426, 428 (1940).
Accord, Re application of Kafka, 27'2 App. Div.
364,71 N.Y. Supp. 2d179 (1947).
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in holding that proof was insufficient to justify revocation
of a driver's license, stated:
"As the hearing is a judicial hearing, it
follows tha:t the decision of the Board must
be based on legal evidence as sufficient weight
to support the specific charges made. By the
terms of the act the Board may in its discretion refuse to grant a license to any app1icant whom for any reason it considers an improper person. A broad discretion is thus
given to the board which of course must be
exercised in a manner reasonable and not
arbitrary. But the power to revoke a license
after a hearing is more restricted. The words
of the act 'for any caetse the board may deem
sufficient' must be construed in the light of
14
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the other parts of the act. The provision for
notice and hearing restricts the power of the
board to act only on the charges made. The
Board revoked the 'license on the ground 'that
Glass was an unfit and improper person to
be licensed. The only support for this finding
is that the board found him guilty of a single
offense of receiving stolen goods. In our opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to support
this finding . . . Although in the circumstances it is perhaps too much to expect that
the established rules of legal procedure should
he followed with the exactness required of a
court of law, yet it is only fair to the accused
that 'there should be a su!bstantial compliance
with the fundamental rules of legal proceedings ... " p. 245. Glass v. State Board of Public Roads, R.I., 115 A'tl. 244, (1921).
In Willis v. Commonwealth, Va., 56 S. E. 2d 222,
( 1949), Willis was given a notice to appear and show
cause why his license should not be suspended or revoked because he had been convicted of reckless driving on March 14, 1947, and that he had been involved
in .accidents in Virginia on July 25, 1946, August 14,
proceeding to suspend or revoke driving privileges
because of involvement in accidents, the burden of
proof was upon the Commonwealth. It sta:ted that
while the properly authenticated abstract of a conviction of the defendant for reckless driving may
constitute prima facie evidence that he operated
his motor vehicle recklessly on the occasion involved
and casts upon the defendant the burden of proof
15
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that his conduct was not such as to show that he
was an unsafe driver or that his continued operation of a motor vehicle constitutes a hazard to
other highway users.
"If the explanation given in his testimony is reasonable and credible, especially
when not contradicted by testimony of any
other witness, it should not be disregarded
but should be weighed along with the other
evidence in the case . . . the test is whether
the revocation or suspension of the operator's
license' is necessary for the safety of [others]
on the highway'. :This must be determined on
the 'basis of the past conduct of the defendant." ( p. 224)
The court held that the introduction at the
hearing of reports of drivers of other cars and of
investigating officers was prejudicial error.
"We hold that it was prejudicial error
for 'the court to consider the ex parte statements contained in the reports. A fair trial,
to be in conformity with the statutory provisions referred to above, required that the
appellant be given an opportunity to crossexamine the persons who made these statements. The reports themselves were c'learly
inadmissible under the mandate of 'the statute.
"The purpose of the statute is to deny
the use of the highways to persons who are
known to have been so reckless in their customary operation of motor vehicles that a
repetition of the same, or similar conduct,
16
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may be expected, and if it occurs, it will constitute a menace to the safety of others. The
statute has not only a laudable object, but a
necessary one. Accidents due to carelessness
or recklessness are taking a terrible toll of life
and limb. But it was intended to apply only
'to drivers who are, in fact, unsafe, and this
fact the statute contemplates must be proved
by clear and reliable evidence at a fair trial."
See also Stella v. MacDuff, 281 App. Div. 800,
119 N. Y. Supp. 2d 483 (1953).
The trial judge neither treated this as a review
of an administrative hearing or as a de novo proceeding. He assumed that in the hearing before him 'the
burden was upon McAnerney to overcome 'the administrative finding. In order to do this, the judge
should have at least looked to the administrative
record to see if these v;e:re even colorable compliance
with the statute and administrative due process.
This would be the minimum standard for proper
judicial revie·w. This was not done, and even if it
had been done, the administrative record clearly
showed tha:t there was not one scintilla of proper
evidence to support 'the administrative finding. If,
on the other hand, Section 41-2-20 Utah Code Annotated 1953 is construed as requiring a hearing de
novo, then this was obviousily not done here, as the
State did nothing more to sustain its position than
to introduce in evidence' (the transcript does not even
show this was done) three unidentified blue pieces
17
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of paper. Under either alternative, the trial court's
procedure was improper.
Even if the means used by the State to prove
its case were proper, the evidence is not
sufficient to prove habitual negligence.
To establish even a prima facie case under the
statute, the State must have evidence of "three
viola;tions" of the Motor Vehicle Code. Mr. Miller ·
relied solely upon the "Report of Conviction for
Violation of Motor Vehicle Law." These pieces of
paper remained unidentified, out of court declarations by unidentified parties. Other than those pieces
of paper there is no evidence of a conviction at all.
There is no evidence that a complaint was ever filed
in any of these matters, nor is there one bit of testimony that McAnerney was convicted of any of these
offenses.
Even the "ticket" or "citation" issued by a traffic officer (such as the one appended to Exhibit 3)
is merely a notice 'to appear. (Sec. 41-6-167 UCA
'53). As traffic offenses are a crime (Sec. 41-6-164
DCA '53), the Code of Criminal Procedure applies,
and this require the commencement of the action
by complaint under oath (Sec. 77-57-2; 77-10-1 UCA
'5'3) . Even the statutory provision that forfeiture
of 'bai'l is equivalent to a conviction (Sec. 41-2-17c
DCA '53) certainly means bai'l posted after a complaint has been filed and an action properly commenced.
c.

18
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This problem is one that this court is of course
quite familiar with because of the rule enacted by
it on January 7, 1958, to be effective February 1,
1959, providing a procedure whereby notices given
by police officers may 'be treated as complaints.
Moreover, each Utah offense charged against
McAnerney \Vas a speeding charge for exceeding
posted limits. Under Utah law, speeds in excess of
posted limi ~s a ~e only prima facie evidence tha:t such
speeds were not reasonable and prudent, and the sole
statutory prohibition is that a driver may not drive
at a speed greater than is "reasonable and prudent
under the conditions and having regard to the actual
and potential hazards then existing." Section 41-646, Utah Code Annotated 1953. A review of the
transcript of McAnerney's testimony in these cases,
which is the only evidence before the court, sure1y
does not justify a finding that his speed was not
reasonable and prudent under the conditions.
However, even if it would appear from his
testimony that in one or two instances he was not
exercising a reasonable and prudent standard, this
is far from saying that this is evidence that he is
prone to habitually so act. To prove habitual conduct, there must be some evidence that the person
acts this way more frequently than he does not.
For a man who drives up to 1,000 miles a week to
be negligent once or twice in eighteen months is no
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evidence at all as to what he does as a matter of
habit. Concededly, if a man when driving only four
times in eighteen months was arrested and convicted of speeding in three such instances, the evidence of habit might be more persuasive, but this
mere'ly shows that such a three-time test or standard
is too vague and unreliable and has little correlation to the actual facts in each case.
POINT III.
'THE S'TATE ERRED IN USING THE SAME EVIDENCE TWICE.

McAnerney' s original suspension (reduced to
a restriction) was based upon alleged offenses on
March 8, 1956, March 28, 1957 and May 28, 1957.
The Department made its determination as to these
facts and exacted its penalty. McAnerney then went
for almost a year without any violations at all in
the State of Utah until a speeding charge on May
19, 1958. Yet the Department then sought to resurrect the two latter of the previous charges and because the last three came vvithin an eighteen month
period, McAnerney's 1icense was suspended again,
this time for a six-month period.
Under this procedure, the repentent driver has
little chance of redemption. Each offense thereafter
brings with it a penalty of ever increasing severity.
There is absolutely no language in the statute to
indicate that these offenses should bring a cumula20
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tive penalty. Such procedure certainly smacks of
double jeopardy in the civil field. Reference therefore to the offenses used to impose a previous sanction is improper.
POINT IV.
COURTS HAVE NOT HESI'TATED TO RIGIDLY
CONSTRUE STATUT'ES OF THIS SORT.

Often the courts have proved the last recourse
of the citizen from administrative bullying. Whether
one classifies the driver's license as a property right
or merely as a privilege, it is clear that in the middle
of the 20th Century the right to drive an automobile is of extreme value, particularly where the
man's livelihood depends upon this, as in the case
of Mr. McAnerney here.
'The courts have heretofore not hesitated in
setting up exacting tests in those cases where this
righ't is sought to be taken from one of its citizens.
Thus our neighbor state of Wyoming quite recently held a statute dealing with revocation of
drivers' licenses unconstitutional. Eastwood v. Wyoming Highway Department, 301 P. 2d 818 ( 19'56).
That court quoted with approval a Virginia case
where the court stated:
"'The majority of the cases lay down the
rule that statutes or ordinances vesting discretion in administrative officers and bureaus
must lay down rules and tests to guide and
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control them in the exercise of the discretion
gran ted in order to be valid . . ." Citing
Thompson v. Smith (Va.) 154 S. E. 579, 71
A.L.R. 604.
·The Supreme Court of Idaho has also held that
a driver's license is a property right and that the
procedure for revocation thereof followed in that
case was unconstitutional. State v. Kouni (Ida.
1938) 76 P. 2d 917.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, appellant contends that the
administrative procedure used by the State is improper and unconstitutional, and that the State has
failed to prove even 'by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant is an habitually negligent
driver.
Respectfully submitted,
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MABEY
BILLINGS & STODDARD
Albert J. Co1ton
Attorneys for Appellant.
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